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Firm Performance in the Western Balkan States: the Impact of 
European Union Membership and Access to Finance 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the productivity performance of Balkan firms within and 
outside the European Union (EU) including the influence of loans.  A multiple 
treatment model is used to compare the effects on productivity of membership and 
loans, both separately and collectively, which in the case of loans allows a separate 
analysis of their influence on firms in non-member states.  The use of conditional 
quantile regressions measures the effect on productivity of membership and loans 
separately as treatment variables. This provides an analysis of where the treatment 
influence is greatest across the distribution curve and identifies the significance of 
selected control variables on the outcome. Within the full sample, the findings 
indicate that EU membership and loans have a positive effect on productivity; 
membership being more important than loans.  Outside the EU, firms in receipt of 
loans are more productive than those without.  However, the significance of both 
membership and loans is restricted to the lower end of the productivity distribution 
curve.  The manufacturing sample shows that EU membership has a significant 
positive effect across 70% of the deciles measured , whilst the influence of loans is  
restricted to the lower deciles , with rental capital (leasing) also positively 
significant in the lower four deciles.  In the services sector however, membership 
is significant up to 90% of the distribution, with loans at 60%.   
Key Words: Transition economies; Firm productivity, EU membership; Access to 
loans; Multi-level model, Quantile regression 
JEL Classification C21, D24, F19, O16 
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INTRODUCTION1 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the influence of EU membership and access 
to finance on the productivity of firms in the Western Balkans   It analyses the 
productivity performance of EU firms against those within the accession process 
and identifies whether there is a relevance to a strong institutional and regulatory 
framework. It also confirms findings in the literature (see Levine, 2005; Volz, 2010) 
that loans contribute to improved productivity and, by disaggregating the full 
sample, it identifies these influences across specific business sectors and examines 
the impact of EU membership and loans across the productivity distribution curve 
identifying areas of maximum influence across both full and disaggregated samples.   
 
The expansion of the EU from 15 to 27 states in the period 2004-2013 is claimed 
to have led to significant economic and geopolitical benefits to the new member 
states (NMS) of Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia. However, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, in the pre-accession 
process, bring into question whether enlargement fatigue will prevent these 
countries ever achieving membership.  In the 1990s, ethnic wars caused hardship 
and significant disruption to societal and institutional development, issues which 
must be addressed before accession can be considered (Vachudova. 2014). “Since 
the early 2000’s the EU has emerged as the primary actor in state building in the 
Western Balkans. Based on a dual strategy of state building and European 
integration, the EU has sought to replace other international organisations in the 
post-conflict reconstruction of the Western Balkans” (Bieber, 2011, p.1783). 
This study explores, at the firm level, the impact of EU membership and 
access to loans on firm productivity in the Balkan countries of Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and 
Slovenia. It compares the levels of output per worker in EU member countries in 
contrast to those outside and uses capital, cost per worker, skill level, foreign 
ownership, size, age, bureaucracy and competition as control variables. Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Slovenia are already EU member states and Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia are theoretically part of the pre-
accession process.  
Significant literature exists on the macroeconomic relationship between the 
EU and the Balkans (see Bieber, 2011; Bechev, 2012; Petrovic and Smith, 2013; 
Prokopijević and Tasić, 2015). This study extends the debate and explores whether, 
at firm level, there are productivity opportunities to be gained through EU 
membership. New trade theory states that firms become more productive as a result 
of increasing economies of scale and network effects (Krugman, 1979). The EU is 
                                                          
1 This study was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council project ‘Access to 
Finance for SMEs’ under Grant number ES/M002462/1. 
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a customs union of 27 counties, which facilitates the development of these attributes 
and provides a platform to encourage foreign direct investment and exports, the key 
drivers of improved productivity.    
Additionally, there is evidence that access to finance is a constraint on firm 
level growth in non-EU member countries whereas, with respect to leverage, there 
is convergence within the EU.  Thus, it would appear that within the EU, as a result 
of improved financial intermediation, access to finance improves, while outside the 
EU, credit constraint continues to be a problem, however correlation should not 
imply causality. (EBRD, 2016).   
Until recently, the contribution of finance to economic growth and 
development was not fully recognised in economic literature, although there is now 
a strong theoretical foundation for the argument that finance can provide a stimulus 
to productivity (Levine, 2005). This has been increasingly supported by empirical 
research, some of which specifically relates to transitional countries (Volz, 2010).  
However, there have been few firm- level studies on the impact of EU membership 
and finance on firm performance in the Balkan region and this paper also provides 
a contribution to this under-researched area (Shimbov et al 2016, Botric 2013 and 
Berman and Hericot 2010). The study focuses on all firms, including a 
disaggregated analysis of services and manufacturing. Enhancing productivity is of 
greater consequence in developing economies than in the developed world because 
improvements within a national cohort of heterogeneous firms results in the 
evolution of a more effective industrial base (Roberts and Tybout, 1996)  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 of this paper 
provides a review of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 
outlines data and methodology and Section 4 the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The Western Balkans are increasing their participation in international production 
networks (IPN) where fragmentation of the manufacturing process has created an 
interwoven network of inter industry trade flows across countries, involving the 
transition of intermediate goods across borders until a final assembly destination is 
reached (Gabrisch et al. 2016; Shimbov et al., 2016). This vertical integration trend 
led to the new trade theory (NTT) hypothesis that the main factor determining 
international trade is economies of scale and network effects occurring in key 
industry sectors. These can be sufficiently significant to outweigh the more 
traditional theory of comparative advantage. This study concentrates primarily on 
the “new” trade theory, originally espoused by Krugman in 1979, in which he 
developed his general equilibrium model of non-comparative advantage trade, 
arguing that returns to scale were an important determinant of growing international 
trade (Krugman, 1979). This has led to research seeking to determine the effect of 
trade policy and multi-factor content on productivity, profitability, exports, firm 
size, imports and the effect on local producers.  
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In his review of literature, Tybout (2003) concludes that foreign competition 
causes price cost mark ups to fall and locally based firms to contract, or even exit 
the market. International trade allows larger more productive firms to expand their 
market base creating greater efficiency, while exporters increase in size, are more 
efficient and supply better quality products. Hence, unfettered access to the EU 15 
developed market economies, allied to increased competition because of imports 
from the same source, conforms to Tybout’s findings and new trade theory. It 
would therefore be prudent to evaluate the success of those Balkan countries 
which are members against those which are not. At the macroeconomic level, 
convergence between the EU 15 (countries joining before 2004) and the Balkan 
countries, appears to be occurring at a slow pace. This might indicate that some 
key determinants are not in place (Botric, 2011). Conflicting views in literature 
relate to the advantages of EU accession (Börzel 2011) and whilst his paper 
emphasises governance issues, which could be interpreted as political failure, 
others claim that there is an inherent developmental divide between the Western 
and Eastern European states which the EU fails to rectify. Epstein (2014) claims 
that in areas of consumption and FDI the type of investment encouraged by the 
EU has contributed to both a division of labour and exclusion from innovative 
processes thus depriving the Eastern states of economic gains.  She further 
criticizes the World Bank and other supra-national institutions of an overly 
optimistic view of the benefits of EU expansion resulting from the imperative of 
supporting the neoliberal agenda (see also Epstein and Jacoby 2014). 
Furthermore, the internalisation of the Washington Consensus paradigm and its 
application throughout the customs union provides a further justification for an 
alternative view of the potential benefits of membership (see Lutz and Kranke 
2014. Fitoussi and Saraceno 2012). 
Borocz (2012) also claims that Hungary has failed to capitalise on EU 
membership due to the dominance of EU capital in assembly plant manufacturing 
resulting in high import content in relation to exports allied to labour market failure.  
The unrelenting claims of supra-national institutions and the tendency amongst 
economists to accept as a given the neoliberal agenda drowns the discordant views 
of the dissenting voices.  Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: EU membership provides a productivity advantage to firms 
within the new member states. 
Recent academic literature revealed the relevance of the link between 
finance and firms' productivity growth and whilst this study is not confined to 
research on SMEs, they represent 90 per cent of the sample (Levine 2005). A study 
by the World Bank (2014) revealed that in emerging markets, more than 50% of 
SMEs are credit constrained, 70% do not use external financing from banking or 
equity financial institutions, and of the 30% receiving credit, 15% are 
underfinanced from these sources (Hölscher et al., 2016). 
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Wagner (2014) in his survey of credit constraints and international trade 
suggests that work carried out in this area is itself constrained because results to 
date cannot be compared because of the different econometric models in use with 
an added limitation that there is a paucity of sound measures of credit constraints 
for smaller companies.   
Access to finance by SMEs has long been problematical. Debate has 
focussed on whether the existence of information asymmetries creates 
circumstances of credit shortages or credit gluts (EBRD, 2015). In this study, the 
basis of the analysis of loans on firm level performance is contained in Levine’s 
(2005) review of the theoretical and empirical literature on finance and growth. 
Levine identifies five main ways by which, in theory, finance contributes to 
economic growth: the availability of savings, investment information, the 
management of risk, the existence of a due diligence process and the facilitation of 
trade in economic commodities and services. Such considerations provide good 
reason to suggest that finance has an important role to play in development, but they 
do not, as Levine (2005) argues, constitute a rationale to prefer banks over other 
forms of finance.  
According to Levine (2005), the dominant form of empirical research has 
been a cross-country study linking economic growth to a measure of financial 
development. The potential importance of firm level studies in resolving a number 
of issues, including better detailed information, causality and firm heterogeneity, 
have long been acknowledged in literature. Nonetheless, there are few firm level 
studies on the effects of finance on productivity and other aspects of firm 
performance (Hölscher, et al., 2016).   
A recent study by Levine and Warusawitharana (2014) makes a significant 
contribution, in part, by enhancing the theoretical foundations for the link between 
finance and productivity growth, finding that financial frictions affected both 
investment and output per worker.  There is some evidence that, following the 
accession of new member states, credit constraint was responsible for the lack of 
productivity improvements in relation to the more established members of the EU. 
In relation to the transitional economies, Djalilov and Hölscher (2016) found 
evidence that the early transition economies, namely the new member states, had 
greater credit availability from banks and the financial sector than the states of the 
old Soviet Union. Furthermore, they had lower loan loss provisions and less 
reliance on equity, indicating a level of greater efficiency and strength in depth 
within the banking sector. Literature suggests that the predominance of foreign 
banks with enhanced credit scoring criteria, allied to the necessity to improve 
capital ratios at home, may be contributory factors, together with the 
underdevelopment of capital markets (Caviglia et al., 2002; Thimann, 2002; Volz, 
2010; Estrin and Uvalic, 2016).  There is little evidence of exploration of the 
relationship between the level of productivity, accession to EU membership and 
access to finance, although work done suggests a reduction in productivity due to 
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misallocation and credit constraint.  Gabrisch 2015, however, maintains that a 
major factor in credit constraints is the level of nonperforming loans and the 
reluctance of policy makers to confront the issue and this together with a poor level 
of financial intermediation lies at the heart of the problem of access to finance.  This 
paper will contribute by identifying the effect of membership and receipt of loans 
both in and out of the EU, and through the use of quantile regression, measure 
where, along the productivity distribution curve, the greatest influence lies. 
Therefore, we formulate the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: The availability of loans enhances the effect of EU 
membership. 
Hypothesis 2b: The availability of loans improves performance in firms 
outside the EU. 
Hypothesis 2c: The availability of loans improves productivity. 
Since Slovenia and a further eight Eastern European transitional economies 
acceded to the EU in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia 
in 2013, the question has arisen whether the countries of the Western Balkans could 
be integrated more promptly.  Barriers to membership remain within the Balkan 
five (Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia) and whilst 
this paper is not focussed on foreign direct investment (FDI), there is empirical 
evidence that a negative attitude towards investing in the Balkans can be alleviated, 
to some degree, by EU membership (Estrin and Uvalic, 2016). Other factors include 
the size of the economies and distance from investment hubs, but principally the 
paucity of institutional processes. There is ‘a negative “Western Balkans” effect’ 
on FDI (Estrin and Uvalic, 2013, p.5) resulting in the need for firms to find 
alternative sources of finance either from an internal capital market or in the form 
of loans.  The Western Balkans were, however, the recipients of substantial capital 
inflows prior to the financial crisis of 2008 but were subjected to significant 
outflows thereafter (Gabrisch et al 2016) and it is plausible to suggest that different 
investor priorities rather than a negative attitude to the Balkans may be an 
alternative rationale to the paucity of FDI.  There was an assumption amongst 
economists that the privatisation programme undertaken by the Eastern European 
transition economies would result in a significant improvement in firm level 
performance. The result has been more nuanced, with firms bought by foreign 
investors being significantly more productive than those in domestic ownership (see 
Gabrisch and Hölscher, 2006; Wagner, 2012; Estrin et al., 2009; Irdam et al., 2015; 
Waldkirch, 2014). From the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, we 
formulate the following: 
Hypothesis 3: FDI has a positive influence on firms’ productivity both in 
manufacturing and service sectors.  
 
In relation to exports, a survey of 54 micro-econometric studies in 34 
countries published between 1995 and 2006, shows that exporting firms are more 
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productive than non-exporters (Fryges and Wagner, 2007). Thus, it is important to  
control for exports in any study relating to productivity. Using firm-level data, 
Berman and Héricourt (2010) found that productive efficiency, when allied to 
access to finance, increased the propensity to export. Minetti and Zhu (2011), using 
Italian firm level data, found that firms facing credit constraints exhibited a weaker 
export performance.  
Hypothesis 4: Exports positively affects firms’ productivity in 
manufacturing and services sectors. 
As a driver of productivity, the EBRD Transition Report for 2014 focussed 
on innovation but recognised that capital intensity (capital per worker), proximity 
to the main business centre (infrastructure), skilled labour, competition and foreign 
ownership are also important determinants. Additionally, firms trading nationally 
or internationally are more productive than firms primarily targeting local markets 
(EBRD, 2014). Literature also reveals that a more competitive market results in 
improved productivity (Bridgeman, 2010). Clearly, membership of the EU 
significantly increases the competitive environment. Within the transitional 
economies, there were concerns about the development of competition policy, 
although these have been largely allayed (Gabrisch and Hölscher, 2006). Within the 
new member states there is evidence that “a well-designed and well implemented 
competition policy has a significant impact on TFP growth” (Buccirossi et al., 2013, 
p.1334). It is assumed the greater the skill base the more productive the firm and 
evidence suggests the greater the proportion of highly skilled workers, the more 
positive the result for labour productivity and profit. A more comprehensive review 
of Western Balkans competitiveness and productivity constraints can be found in 
Gabrisch et al. (2016) who emphasises the necessary improvements required in 
infrastructure and institutional development.  These additional determinants have 
an influence on the productive environment and are therefore legitimate covariates 
to EU membership and loans, which are the treatment variables in this paper.  
The regression analyses controls for capital, skilled labour, competition, 
exports and foreign ownership together with infrastructure and institutional 
development. The outcome variable productivity, measured as output per worker, 
has been selected as a measure of firm level performance due to its importance to 
economic growth.  A comprehensive review of literature suggests that whilst 
managers have a good deal of control over the endogenous determinants of 
production, they can do little about exogenous influences (Syverson 2011).  Whilst 
a good deal of literature exists on the subject (see Syverson 2011 for more detail), 
the majority deals with the specific issues grounded in theory; little exists that 
examines the relative performance of firms subjected to significant economic 
change, the materiality of funds flow and capital allocation. 
Besides EU membership as one of the treatment variables (which is self-
explanatory), the second treatment variable- loan - is constructed from the question 
in BEEPS 2013 survey: “At this time, does this establishment have a line of credit 
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or a loan from a financial institution?” It then allows the comparison of the 
productive performance of those in receipt of loans against those with none. 
Campos et al. (2014) investigated whether membership of the EU improved both 
per capita income and labour productivity using synthetic counterfactual 
methodology which measures the outcome against a synthetically produced 
counterfactual of the outcome if membership had not been achieved.  They find that 
membership of the EU provided benefits for all countries with the exception of 
Greece. This study is an important contribution to the debate on the efficacy of EU 
membership and adds to that debate by comparing two groups of countries, one in 
membership and the other in the accession process, providing an insight in the 
differing performance of both EU membership, non-EU membership and loans in 
each of the two groups, augmented by an identification of the effect of observed 
variables on the outcome variable (output per worker) across the quantile 
distribution curve.  Additionally, the scant nature of literature analysing the effect 
of EU membership, allied to access to finance and other key determinants to firm 
level performance, justifies the claim that this paper is a contribution to the research 
gap.  
METHODOLOGY  
The paper compares the influence of EU membership and jointly and severally, 
receipt of loans on the productivity (dependent variable) performance, measured as 
output per worker, of firms in the Western Balkans. The use of output per worker 
as a measure of productivity follows other papers which have used BEEPS data and 
log of sales divided by total employees for measurement purposes (see D’Souza et 
al. 2017, Pfeifer 2015, Waldkirch 2014, Dutz and O’Conell 2013, Gorodnichenko 
and Schnitzer 2013, Ricci and Trionfetti 2012).  The comparison is between firms 
within EU member states and those outside, with the objective of measuring 
performance differences. The analysis identifies the influence of membership and 
loans at points across the productivity distribution curve to include the significance 
of control variables selected with reference to theory and literature. The selected 
methodology answers the key objectives of ensuring a robust estimator to reduce 
bias on unobservables.   
We use a multiple treatment approach (with two treatment variables - EU 
membership and loans) and perform quantile regressions using the ivqte Stata 
command which has the advantage of producing analytical standard errors that are 
consistent also in the  event of heteroscedasticity (Frolich and Melly 2010). Two 
distinct techniques are used – the Inverse Probability Weighted Regression 
Adjustment (IPWRA) estimator and quantile treatment effects (QTE) modelling. 
The former is based on the premise that the effect of EU membership and receipt 
of loans as a treatment assignment – the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) 
effect – must be estimated. Essentially, the research follows the most common 
approach by matching, by means of propensity scores, EU firms and/or firms 
receiving loans (“treated firms”) to non-EU firms which did not receive a loan 
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(“untreated firms”) with similar characteristics– which thus constitute a comparison 
group– and then to estimate the difference between output per worker (productivity) 
for treated firms and the outcome for non-treated firms (Cerulli, 2010).  
To attribute the estimated difference to a treatment assignment safely, 
treated firms must be similar to untreated in all respects except for EU membership 
and/or loan receipt. This depends on two identifying assumptions. The conditional 
independence assumption (CIA), or selection on observables, which posits that the 
outcome in the case of no treatment is independent of treatment assignment, 
conditional on covariates X (Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) and the 
overlap or common support condition, whereby the estimated propensity scores 
take positive values (Heckman and Vytilacil, 2007).  
Treatment effects are estimated in the multiple treatment context to ensure 
that EU membership and non-membership are carried out simultaneously. A 
matching approach with multiple treatments is first introduced by Lechner (2001). 
There are M+1 treatments, whereby treatment equals to zero denotes the absence 
of both EU membership and loan receipt. The average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) effect is then calculated as: 
 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑚|𝑇 = 𝑚) − (𝑌𝑙|𝑇 = 𝑚) (1) 
 
Where m denotes the treatment level, l represents the comparison group (the 
treatment level to which m is compared), and Ym and Yl denote outcomes in states 
m and l respectively.  
The inverse probability of treatment weighting regression adjustment 
(IPWRA) estimator is employed; the main advantage being its double robust 
property. If either the propensity score model (the outcome model) or the treatment 
model is correctly specified, the estimator will yield treatment effects with a lower 
bias than other estimators not characterized by the double-robustness property 
(Hirano et al., 2003). The IPWRA estimator consists of three steps. Firstly, for each 
firm in the sample, the treatment model estimates the propensity score, which is the 
probability for each firm of participation (“treatment assignment”). Given that 
multiple treatment effects are evaluated, the propensity scores are estimated by a 
multinomial logit model, incorporating all four treatment levels: no EU membership 
and no loan; no EU membership with loan; EU membership and no loan; and EU 
membership with loan. The choice of the model is motivated by the nature of the 
treatment variable, which has more than two outcomes with no natural ordering. 
The propensity scores enable firms to be matched within each treatment level. 
Secondly, regressions are estimated by the fractional logit model, as the outcome 
variable is the inverse of the estimated propensity scores and is used as weights on 
covariates X and the treatment dummies. Thirdly, from each regression, the ATT 
effect is computed as the difference in the weighted averages of the predicted 
outcomes. Valid standard errors (of the Huber/White/sandwich type) are reported, 
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which take into account that the estimates are computed in a three-step approach 
(Emsley et al., 2008). 
Typically, the response variable y is some function of predictor variables X, 
so that y = f(X). Most regression applications focus on estimating rates of change 
in the mean of the response variable and are defined for the expected value of y 
conditional on X, E(y | X). This poses problems for regression models with 
heterogeneous variances, such as for firms across countries and industry sectors. 
Heterogeneous variances imply that there may be some changes that do not focus 
exclusively on the mean and others that impact differently across the probability 
distributions. Focusing exclusively on changes in the mean may underestimate, 
overestimate, or fail to distinguish real non-zero changes in heterogeneous 
distributions (Cade et al., 1999). 
The introduction of quantile treatment effects (QTEs) allows the 
measurement of the effect on the outcome variable (productivity) across the 
different percentiles of the productivity distribution curve, using median as opposed 
to the mean. The use of quantile regressions continues to evolve, and model 
selection is dependent on whether the QTE is conditional or unconditional and the 
treatment variables exogenous or endogenous. The conditional model is estimated, 
thus controlling for firm and market characteristics and, due to the lack of valid 
instruments in the datasets, it is not possible to estimate conditional endogenous 
models. Thus, EU membership and access to loans are regarded as exogenous. This 
restricts the estimation strategy to the application of the estimator proposed by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978). 
The standard for linear quantile regressions is a conditional model assuming 
selection on observables. It is assumed that Y is a linear function of X and D. The 
model for potential outcomes is: 
 𝑌𝑖
𝑑 = 𝑋𝑖 𝛽
𝜏 + 𝑑𝛿𝜏 + 𝜀𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄𝜀𝑖
𝜏 = 0       (2) 
 
So x is a vector of the conditional exogenous variables, i=1,……,n and d ∈ (0, 1) 
is a set membership of the treatment variables EU membership or loans.  𝑄𝜀
𝜏 refers 
to the 𝜏𝑡ℎ quantile of the unobserved random variable𝜀𝑖. It is assumed that Qτ (εi| 
β, xi) = 0 and is introduced to ensure that the random errors are centred on the τ -th 
quantile (Marino and Farcomeni 2015).  𝛽𝜏𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝜏 are the unknown parameters of 
the model.  𝛿𝜏  represents the conditional QTE’s at quantile  𝜏 . The linearity 
assumption above is insufficient to identify the QTE’s because the observation 𝐷𝑖 
may be correlated with 𝜀𝑖. The assumption is that D and X are exogenous. The 
selection on observables with X can be taken to be: 
 𝜀‖ (𝐷, 𝑋) (3) 
 
Taking Equations (2) and (3) together implies that 𝑄𝑌|𝑋,𝐷
𝜏 = 𝑋𝛽𝜏 + 𝐷𝛿𝜏  which 
allows the recovery of the unknown parameters of the potential outcomes from the 
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joint distributions of the observed variables Y, X and D. The estimator by Koenker 
and Basset (1978) can now be utilised to estimate the unknown coefficients: 
 (?̂?𝜏, 𝛿𝜏) = arg min 𝛽, 𝛿 ∑ 𝜌𝜏 (𝜇) (𝑌𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝛽 − 𝐷𝑖𝛿)    (4) 
 
where 𝜌𝜏(𝜇) = 𝜇 ∗ {𝜏 − 1(𝜇 < 0}. The IVQTE model used generates analytical 
standard errors that are also consistent in the event of heteroscedasticity (Frolich 
and Melly 2010).2 
DATA 
The data for this study was taken from the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) produced by the World Bank and European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). BEEPS is a firm-level survey based 
on face-to-face interviews with managers and examines the quality of the business 
environment.  The survey data has been used in more than 450 papers since 2012 
which are published in a number of highly ranked journals (for a comprehensive 
list of examples see the methodology section p.10). The survey offers a 
representative picture of the business climate experienced by private firms together 
with firm performance and characteristics. The survey sample provides 
comparative data across time, countries and firms and allows disaggregation to size, 
sector and regions.  The data is used in academic and policy papers with more than 
300 papers written to date (World Bank 2016). Data was obtained from the 2013 
survey consisting of nine countries in the Balkan region, three of which, at the time 
of the survey, were EU members.3 The sample allowed the evaluation of the effect 
of EU membership on firm performance and the significance of loans and access to 
finance on firms in the EU and in countries in transition. Additionally, the influence 
of certain key determinants was measured (for the variable description, see Table 
A1 in the Appendix). 
The descriptive statistics in Table A2 in the Appendix indicate that the 
majority of the sample is services firms. From a total of 2,433 firms, 90% (or 2,179 
firms) are SMEs, as noted earlier which, on the assumption that this reflects the 
total population, demonstrates their importance to the economy. Output per worker 
is broadly similar, with service firms being marginally more productive. 
Manufacturing companies have a larger capital base and a greater propensity to 
export. Between service and manufacturing firms the gap between the costs per 
worker is significant.  
 
                                                          
2 A more comprehensive explanation of the estimation of quantile treatment effects in Stata can be 
found in Frolich and Melly (2010). 
3 The inclusion of Croatia as an EU member in this study may be controversial since the accession 
date and survey results coincide, however, we believe that EU membership is the formal end to a 
process that has taken many years in transition and the economic conditions within the country 
would already conform to the acquis communautaire (Börzel, 2011). 
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MODEL SPECIFICATION  
To estimate the individual and joint effects of EU membership and access to loans 
on productivity (measured as output per worker), the variable Treatment was 
created with the following values: 
- Treatment (T) =0 if a firm is not in EU and did not received a loan (57%); 
- Treatment (T) =1 if a firm is in EU but did not receive a loan (53%) 
- Treatment (T) =2 if a firm is not in EU but has received a loan; (43%) 
- Treatment (T) =3 if a firm is in EU and has received a loan (47%) 
 
The use of EU membership as a treatment variable allows a comparison of 
the productivity of firms within and outside the EU. This allows an analysis of the 
effect of the economic shock of joining a significantly more productive economic 
bloc.   
The outcome variable productivity (measured as output per worker), is 
analysed in relation to EU membership and receipt of loans whose relationship, as 
factors of production, is predicated on the premise that misallocation of capital, 
following the adoption of the euro and a reduction in interest rates, led to a reduction 
in productivity in Southern Europe (Gopinath et al 2015).   
The selection of matching variables is predicated by reference to relevant 
literature where each has been identified as influencing firm level performance.4 To 
minimise the selection on unobservables, the models include a large number of 
control variables (see Epifani, 2003; Segerstrom and Gustafsson, 2006; Bellack et 
al., 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Bridgeman, 2010; Covers, 2014; Levine and 
Warusawitharana, 2014; Waldkirch, 2014; Estrin and Uvalic, 2016). The list of 
matching (control variables) and their definitions are presented in Table A1. 
There is some evidence that the NMS are beginning to achieve convergence with 
the original EU 15, albeit due to economic stagnation within the Eurozone this is 
proceeding at a comparatively slower pace (Havlik 2015). Equally the EBRD 2016 
believes that progress in the Balkans is being retarded as a result of financial 
imbalances, credit constraint and a lack of FDI (see also Estrin and Uvalic 2016).  
The misallocation of capital may be an additional constraint (Gopinath et al 2015). 
This justifies the use of the second treatment variable; access to finance, measured 
as receipt of loans. 
Closing the productivity and technology gap between the transition 
countries of Eastern Europe and the EU is an important element of the need to 
achieve economic convergence and European cohesion. The influence of capital 
accumulation is critical since it will improve both labour productivity and reduce 
                                                          
4 Where values are monetary, they are measured in different currencies requiring conversion into a 
common currency. Using the 2013 official exchange rates, national currencies were converted into 
US dollars.  
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the technology gap (Filippetti and Peyrache, 2013).  It is therefore important to 
control for capital in relation to the measurement of productivity and since BEEPs 
allows for the disaggregation of capital into balance sheet, replacement and rental 
(leasing) it enables an analysis of the significance of each of these variables on the 
outcome. 
The justification for including exports and skilled workers amongst the 
control variables is based on Wagner (2012), who  found that exporters were more 
productive and wage premia were statistically significant, indicating that skilled 
workers have a positive effect on firm productivity. Equally, in relation to skilled 
workers, there is evidence that Balkan industry lacks skill, due to a mismatch 
between demand and supply exacerbated by the educational failings of individual 
states (Gabrisch et al, 2016, Bartlett 2013). 
Employment rates in the Balkan region are problematical with new EU 
member states at 64% and non -EU member states 46%. Evaluating these figures, 
one might anticipate cost per worker to be suffering some downward pressure, 
however, a combination of labour market rigidities, incomplete reform 
programmes, a strong social welfare net and migration of skilled workers have 
raised wages in relation to productivity, particularly in non-EU member states 
(Kovtun et al., 2014). To control for this, the variable Cost per worker is modelled.  
Foreign ownership is a reflection of FDI and evidence exists that it increased 
in the period before accession into the EU, peaking on the date of accession and 
declining slightly thereafter. EU member countries have proved a more attractive 
FDI destination than the Western Balkan states evidenced by a negative effect in 
this region. This is possibly as a result of the lack of institutional reform and the 
establishment of strong structural controls (see Krugman, 1979; Epifani, 2003; 
Estrin et al., 2009; Gustafsson and Segerstrom, 2011; Estrin and Uvalic, 2016; 
Okafor and Webster, 2015). To control for this effect, the variable Foreign 
ownership is included. 
The acqui communitaire (accumulated body of EU law and protocols since 
1958) has guaranteed the development of bureaucratic institutions within the new 
member states, although this process is also evident in those countries of the 
Western Balkans in accession. This is more prominent in Serbia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia than Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (Petrovic and 
Smith, 2013). To control for this, the models variable Bureaucracy is included but 
the inclusion should not imply that this of itself limits productivity (see Table A1 
for variable description).  
With respect to firm characteristics, the model also includes firm size and 
firm age. The inclusion of competition is predicated on the new trade theory and 
specifically Tybout’s (2003) conclusion relating to the effect of foreign firms in 
relation to local pricing and firm survival. The influence of competition also 
resonates with international trade, which suggests that larger, more productive firms 
increase in size and are more efficient. Finally, to account for sectoral 
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heterogeneity, the model includes dummy variables for low tech, mid tech and 
services. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
The first stage is to use the IPWRA estimator to provide a comparison between EU 
firms and non-EU firms and for those with and without loans and the second stage 
of the exercise is to use quantile regression to identify where the effect of EU 
membership and loans is significant along the productivity distribution curve.  The 
evidence can be laid alongside the influence, at each quantile of selected control 
variables, which will further inform the debate by allowing conclusions to be drawn 
as to the significance of the effects at certain points along the distribution curve. 
The disaggregated analysis will allow an increased micro economic evaluation of 
the result.  
Treatment effects of any matching estimator based on the propensity score 
are only estimated in the region of common support. Thus, it is necessary to check 
the overlap of the propensity scores at different treatment levels. The overlap plots, 
reported in Appendix A (figures A1 to A3), reveal that the predicted probabilities 
are not concentrated near 0 or 1, which implies that the overlap assumption is not 
violated (Cattaneo et al., 2013). Descriptive statistics are included in Table A2. 
Step 1 of the estimation procedure is the treatment (selection) model, which 
shows the effects of covariates on the probabilities of different levels of treatment, 
whereby the base is treatment at level 0. Step 2 is the outcome model, which 
estimates the impact of covariates on the outcome variable. The coefficients in the 
models are not of interest in themselves, as the purpose of specifying the model is 
to facilitate the estimation of treatment effects (Cattaneo et al. 2013). Table A3 
reports results for the model estimated in the full sample.5 
Table 1 below shows the estimated treatment effects using the IPWRA 
estimator. For ease of interpretation the results have been transposed into 
percentage point increases or decreases in productivity and expressed as a 
percentage in the text. The analysis covers the full sample of firms in all member 
states and disaggregated samples of services and manufacturing firms. The results 
from the full sample have been included for completeness. However, the paucity of 
observations for capital and skilled workers in the services sector has significantly 
truncated the observations and thus make the results of limited value. This 
limitation also applies to the quantile regression modelling.  Tables 1 to 4 below 
show different levels of observations.  This is due to missing data for capital and 
skilled workers within the BEEPS dataset.   
 
 
                                                          
5 Results for manufacturing and services are not reported but available on request. 
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Table 1. The estimated ATTs effects using the IPWRA estimator with two treatments: EU membership and access to loans. 
 
Outcome 
variable  
Full sample  Service sector  Manufacturing sector  
T= 1  
vs T =0  
T=2  
vs T=0  
T=3 
vs T=0  
T= 1  
vs T =0  
T=2  
vs T=0  
T=3 
vs T=0  
T= 1  
vs T =0  
T=2  
vs T=0  
T=3 
vs T=0  
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
Output per 
worker 
0.616*** 
(0.095) 
0.386*** 
(0.104) 
0.735*** 
(0.134) 
0.704*** 
(0.100) 
0.440*** 
(0.092) 
0.833*** 
(0.107) 
0.597*** 
(0.121) 
0.360*** 
(0.125) 
0.560*** 
(0.141) 
Output per 
worker 
(in %) 
 
0.061*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.039*** 
(0.011) 
0.074*** 
(0.014) 
0.068*** 
(0.010) 
0.043** 
(0.009) 
0.081*** 
(0.019) 
0.059*** 
(0.012) 
0.036*** 
(0.120) 
0.056*** 
(0.015) 
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The analysis indicates that against treatment 0 (firms located outside EU which 
have not received loans) (T = 0), EU firms that have not received loans are 6.1% 
more productive (p<0.01; Column 1). The effect of a loan receipt, introduced after 
the effects of EU membership shows a 1.3 percentage point increase6  (Column 3) 
indicating that loans provide a marginal boost to output. However, the joint effect 
of EU membership and loan receipt is not statistically different from the individual 
effect of EU membership (Column 1), as their 95% confidence intervals overlap. 
This indicates that H1 is supported by these results but, in relation to EU member 
firms, H2 is not supported but is supported in non-EU firms since the effect of a 
loan receipt is 3.9% (p<0.01; Column 2) indicating the efficaciousness of loans to 
non-EU member state firms. However, the joint effect of EU membership and loan 
receipt is not statistically different from the individual effect of a loan receipt, as 
their 95% confidence intervals overlap  This indicates that EU membership and not 
receiving a loan is the key driver to productivity within the NMS, and whilst loans 
provide a marginal advantage within the EU, they are critical to productivity 
improvement for firms outside the EU. Thus, in relation to H1, the efficacy of EU 
membership on productivity is proved but the influence of loan receipt is restricted 
to firms in non-member states (hence supporting H2c). 
In relation to the service sector the results are more pronounced, such that 
the effect of EU membership on productivity is 6.8% (p<0.01; Column 4). This 
effect increases to 8.1% when a loan is added to EU membership (p<0.01; Column 
6). However, the joint effect of EU membership and loan receipt is not statistically 
different from the individual effect of EU membership, as their 95% confidence 
intervals. Non-EU firms receiving loans are 4.3% more productive than non-EU 
firms without loans (p<0.01; Column 5), yet this effect is not statistically different 
than the joint effect of EU membership and loan receipt (Column 6). Thus, our 
results suggest that either EU membership or loan receipt has a positive impact on 
firm productivity, while the joint impact of EU membership and loan receipt does 
not bring additional productivity increase relative to their individual effects and 
hence H1 is only partially supported.  
Within the manufacturing sector, EU firms without a loan are 5.9% more 
productive than non-EU firms without loans (p<0.01; Column 7), whilst EU 
membership combined with a receipt of loans has a statistically significant impact 
(p<0.01), although not larger than the impact of EU membership alone (Column 9). 
The effect of a loan receipt on productivity in non-EU firms is 3.6% (p<0.01; 
Column 8), indicating the greater importance of loans to non-EU firms. 
The IPWRA results test H1 and H2 including its subsections and conclude 
that H1, H2b and H2c are supported concluding that EU membership provides a 
productivity advantage, but there is little evidence that a combination of EU 
                                                          
6 For reasons of brevity percentage results are shown as a percentage but should be interpreted as a 
percentage point increase. 
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membership and loans (H1 and H2b) have an enhanced effect on membership alone 
therefore the enhancing effect of loans is unproven.  However, H2b and H2c are 
supported in relation to firms outside the EU concluding that loans improve 
productivity. 
The IPWRA results are concerned with mean effects and may not reveal the 
array of effects. The use of quantile regressions allows the analysis to identify 
where, along the distribution curve, the effects of EU membership and loans are 
significant and allows an evaluation of the influence of other key variables. The 
distribution of the dependent variable may change in many ways that are either not 
revealed or only partially revealed by an examination of the mean (Frolich and 
Melly, 2010). This study applies selection models based on observables, uses a 
conditional treatment model based on Koenker and Basset (1978) and regresses on 
two treatment variables - EU membership and loans. The regressions are carried 
out on the full Balkan sample and the disaggregated samples of services and 
manufacturing. The outcome variable is productivity (output per worker) and the 
treatment variables of interest in these analyses are EU membership and loans. The 
control variables have been interpreted to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
significant influences extant in each quantile. For ease of observation in all the QTE 
models below, the first and last two quantiles have been included since they either 
reflect the significant results across the productivity distribution, or demonstrate a 
trend which either ends or continues before or after the 8th quantile.7 The estimates 
shown illustrate the significance of the results in each quantile across each of the 
distributions. The monetary values have been rescaled (actual number/1000) to 
provide a coefficient greater than zero where the results are significant.  
Table 2 below shows the results for the effect of EU membership (treatment 
variable) and the control variables on productivity performance over each point (1st 
to 9th decile) of the productivity distribution curve. EU membership is a positive 
and highly statistically significant (p<0.01) in the 1st to the 6th decile with the 
coefficients decreasing in magnitude over the productivity distribution curve. This 
would suggest that firms at the lower end of labour productivity distribution enjoy 
the greatest benefit from membership, with no significant results being seen at the 
upper end of the scale. The importance of capital is also seen as significant with 
rental capital (p<0.01 to p<0.05) being important across the 1st to the 4th decile. 
This may suggest that below the median point of the distribution, equity, as a means 
of capitalisation, is in short supply (Estrin and Uvalic 2016). The negative 
coefficient on age (p<0.05) in the 9th decile may indicate that older firms are less 
productive than more modern enterprises, indicating that they may be privatised 
firms at the top end experiencing issues with dated equipment and/or practices. The 
negative coefficient replacement value of capital (p<0.01) is reported in the 5th and 
8th decile, which may indicate that in parts of the distribution curve, firms are 
                                                          
7 The tables with the results for all the deciles are available on request. 
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struggling to modernise. The positive significance of Bureaucracy (p<0.05) in 1st 
and 9th decile indicates that at the lower and top end of the distribution curve there 
is an awareness of the impact of institutional development, whilst size (p<0.1) in 
the 2nd and 8th decile reveals that this may be restricted to the larger firms. The 
negative coefficient on skilled workers (p<0.01 to p<0.1) is possibly a reflection of 
a skills mismatch allied to a failure of appropriate levels of educational training 
(Gabrisch 2016; Gabrisch et al 2016). An OECD working paper concluded that “the 
main results suggest that higher skill and qualification mismatch is associated with 
lower labour productivity, with over-skilling and under qualification accounting for 
most of these impacts” (McGowan and Andrews, 2015, pp.32). The positive 
coefficient of cost per worker (p<0.1) may be a reflection of the comparative 
advantage of cheaper labour.   
In relation to the services sector, all capital and skill based variables have 
been removed from the model due to a paucity of observations. In contrast to the 
full sample, the services sector indicates that the impact of EU membership is 
positive and highly statistically significant (p<0.01) for the 1st to 8th deciles with no 
significance only amongst the most productive firms. This would suggest that the 
services sector as a whole has received a significant boost from EU membership 
and supports H1. As in the full sample, the declining magnitude of the coefficient 
on EU membership variable is found, suggesting that the most benefit is enjoyed 
by the least productive firms. Foreign ownership has a positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.01 to p<0.05) effect throughout the distribution, indicating the 
relevance of FDI in tandem with EU membership and supports H3. Age and size 
also have positive and statistically significant (p<0.01 to p<0.1 and p<0.01 to 
p<0.05 respectively) effects, suggesting an attraction for larger, older firms to 
foreign investors. Outside the bottom first two deciles of the distribution curve, the 
negative and highly statistically significant (p<0.01) influence of competition in the 
upper deciles of the distribution indicates that, in this sector, the competitive 
environment of the expanded EU is creating pressures within the NMS for the most 
productive firms. Cost per worker has a positive and highly statistically significant 
(p<0.01) impact on firm productivity throughout the whole distribution range.  
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Table 2. Results from the QTE model with EU membership as the treatment and output per worker as the outcome variable8. 
  
Full sample 
 
Manufacturing sector 
 
Service sector 
Independent 
variables  
q.1 q.2 q.8 q.9 q.1 q.2 q.8 q.9 q.1 q.2 q.8 q.9 
             
EU membership 0.477*** 0.352*** 0.080 0.024 0.575*** 0.321*** 0.130 0.117 0.839*** 0.647*** 0.178** 0.011 
 (0.132) (0.109) (0.081) (0.093) (0.135) (0.124) (0.081) (0.090) (0.118) (0.101) (0.085) (0.093) 
Capital (assets) 0.002 0.002 0.001* 0.002* 0.0020** 0.002 0.001* 0.002     
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.127) (0.124) (0.081) (0.092)     
Capital  0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000     
(replacement) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Capital (rental) 0.070*** 0.062*** -0.002 0.020 0.073*** 0.061*** 0.006 0.016     
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.014) (0.047) (0.0250) (0.018) (0.015) (0.038)     
Export 0.493* 0.183 0.131 -0.068 0.206 0.192 0.051 -0.022 0.401 -0.121 0.367 0.390 
 (0.255) (0.282) (0.306) (0.358) (0.314) (0.303) (0.265) (0.353) (0.407) (0.392) (0.388) (0.369) 
Skilled workers -0.348* -0.511** -0.519*** -0.780*** -0.500** -0.479** -0.364** -0.711***     
 (0.211) (0.202) (0.189) (0.217) (0.244) (0.216) (0.176) (0.215)     
Cost per worker 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Foreign owned -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.008*** 0.004** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Firm age  -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006** -0.011* -0.004 -0.002 -0.007*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.010** 0.009 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Bureaucracy 0.213** 0.105 0.082 0.172* 0.213** 0.091 0.158* 0.246** 0.158 0.143* 0.126* 0.089 
 (0.092) (0.084) (0.077) (0.097) (0.104) (0.088) (0.084) (0.102) (0.102) (0.080) (0.069) (0.079) 
Firm size 0.115 0.146* 0.081 0.125* 0.212** 0.125 0.099* 0.150** 0.333*** 0.291*** 0.118** 0.099* 
                                                          
8 Note that the observations for the full, manufacturing and services sample differ.  This is because of the omitted variables of capital and skilled workers in the 
services sector has reduced the service sector contribution to 100 firms.  The 450 observations in the manufacturing sector are the total available and the 
services sector observations have been increased by omitting capital and skilled workers from the regression. 
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 (0.092) (0.083) (0.060) (0.069) (0.094) (0.090) (0.059) (0.066) (0.088) (0.069) (0.052) (0.059) 
Competition -0.037 0.014 -0.098 -0.099 -0.136 0.021 -0.095 -0.116 -0.047 -0.139 -0.233*** -0.259*** 
 (0.128) (0.111) (0.084) (0.091) (0.131) (0.116) (0.086) (0.094) (0.118) (0.097) (0.081) (0.091) 
Low-tech -0.339** -0.407*** -0.283** -0.219* -0.176 -0.361** -0.378*** -0.260**     
 (0.150) (0.137) (0.110) (0.129) (0.181) (0.165) (0.116) (0.130)     
Mid-tech -0.291 -0.287* -0.216* -0.265** -0.184 -0.250 -0.248** -0.287**     
 (0.180) (0.153) (0.111) (0.128) (0.208) (0.167) (0.119) (0.123)     
Services -0.286 -0.471 0.374 0.883* 1.025 0.680 -0.257 -0.527**     
 (0.369) (0.320) (0.370) (0.523) (0.974) (0.703) (0.690) (0.218)     
Constant 9.022*** 9.603*** 10.894*** 11.477*** 9.027*** 9.581*** 10.642*** 11.296*** 7.920*** 8.673*** 11.033*** 11.562*** 
 (0.260) (0.244) (0.183) (0.207) (0.297) (0.270) (0.190) (0.240) (0.155) (0.132) (0.141) (0.174) 
No of obs. 550 550 550 550 450 450 450 450 1,370 1,370 1,370 1,370 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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With respect to the manufacturing sector, the 1st and 2nd decile of the 
distribution finds EU membership to have a positive and highly significant (p<0.01) 
effect, although above the 2nd decile, significance levels and the magnitude of the 
coefficients are declining, with the evidence suggesting support for H1 up to the 7th 
decile.  Balance sheet capital has a positive and significant effect in 1st decile and 
in 8th decile (p<0.01 and p<0.1 respectively). Across the first half of the distribution 
curve, rental capital is positively significant (p<0.05), suggesting that leasing is an 
important source of finance up to the median. The negative coefficients on 
replacement capital in the 3rd decile and 8th decile (p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively) 
indicate that replacing aging assets may be problematical and points to a difficulty 
raising capital within the manufacturing sector, particularly amongst the least 
productive firms. Firm size is statistically significant at the conventional level (from 
1% to 10% level) throughout the distribution, suggesting the importance of 
economies of scale, whilst firm age has a negative effect in 9th decile.  In the upper 
and lower deciles, the positive effect of bureaucracy (p<0.05 to p<0.1) indicates 
the importance of institutional development.  Negative effects of skilled workers 
and positive effects of cost levels per worker feature significantly (at the 1% and 
5% levels) throughout the distribution and these findings are consistent with the 
earlier findings in this study.   
Table 3 below shows the results when loan receipt is the treatment variable. 
In the full sample, loans are only significant in the 1st and 2nd decile (p<0.01 and 
p<0.05 respectively) suggesting an efficacy that is confined to the least productive 
firms and therefore support for H2c is restricted to the bottom 20% of the 
productivity distribution curve. Rental capital has positive and significant (p<0.01) 
effects in the 1st and 2nd deciles, confirming the necessity for borrowed capital 
below the median of the productivity distribution. Bureaucracy and firm size are 
positively significant in the 1st and 9th decile, whilst firm age is negatively 
significant (p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively), which may be indicative of older firms 
being less productive and larger ones having a greater realisation of the influence 
of institutional development. The positive, but marginally significant (p<0.1) 
effects of balance sheet capital in the 1st and 9th decile and the negative, but 
marginally significant (p<0.1) effect of replacement capital in the 9th decile may 
emphasise the impairment to productive development. The negative coefficient on 
skilled workers (p<0.01 to p<0.05) and positive coefficient of cost per worker 
(p<0.01) are features of results throughout the quantile regression models and 
possible explanations have been given earlier in this study.  
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Table 3. Results from the QTE model with a loan receipt as the treatment variable and output per worker as the outcome 
variable.  
Independent 
variables 
Full sample  Manufacturing sector  Service sector  
q.1 q.2 q.8 q.9 q.1 q.2 q.8 q.9 q.1 q.2 q.8 q.9 
             
Loan  0.463*** 0.232** 0.100 -0.016 0.410** 0.241** 0.054 0.063 0.284** 0.319*** 0.080 0.074 
 (0.137) (0.105) (0.084) (0.092) (0.159) (0.115) (0.086) (0.096) (0.141) (0.102) (0.083) (0.088) 
Capital  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002     
(assets) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Capital  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000     
(replacement) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Capital  0.076*** 0.068*** -0.002 0.019 0.079*** 0.059*** 0.011 0.010     
(rental) (0.011) (0.027) (0.016) (0.044) (0.024) (0.000) (0.019) (0.002)     
Export 0.418 0.088 0.191 -0.045 0.205 0.098 0.225 0.037 0.285 -0.164 0.220 0.425 
 (0.295) (0.278) (0.305) (0.336) (0.339) (0.284) (0.274) (0.278) (0.406) (0.441) (0.390) (0.383) 
Skilled  -0.602*** -0.567*** -0.407** -0.803*** -0.632*** -0.272 -0.434** -0.717***     
workers (0.212) (0.207) (0.186) (0.219) (0.237) (0.225) (0.179) (0.217)     
Labour cost 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Foreign  -0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.009*** 0.004** 0.008** 
owned  (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Firm age -0.007* -0.002 -0.002 -0.006** -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005** 0.013** 0.015*** 0.011** 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Bureaucracy 0.175** 0.078 0.080 0.157* 0.115 0.044 0.141 0.210* 0.083 0.109 0.131* 0.104 
 (0.085) (0.077) (0.080) (0.094) (0.090) (0.076) (0.087) (0.108) (0.137) (0.089) (0.070) (0.079) 
Firm size  0.200** 0.181** 0.046 0.120* 0.245*** 0.091 0.052 0.100 0.396*** 0.291*** 0.121** 0.106* 
 (0.087) (0.075) (0.060) (0.063) (0.088) (0.079) (0.059) (0.069) (0.105) (0.073) (0.055) (0.061) 
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Competition -0.019 0.002 -0.143* -0.096 -0.033 -0.063 -0.097 -0.166* -0.113 -0.156 -0.284*** -0.295*** 
 (0.116) (0.103) (0.086) (0.091) (0.129) (0.109) (0.086) (0.097) (0.131) (0.102) (0.081) (0.089) 
Low-tech -0.376** -0.352** -0.335*** -0.221* -0.293* -0.169 -0.382*** -0.269*     
 (0.151) (0.143) (0.112) (0.118) (0.162) (0.161) (0.115) (0.142)     
Mid-tech -0.245 -0.107 -0.215* -0.261** -0.231 0.004 -0.286** -0.315**     
 (0.179) (0.148) (0.117) (0.116) (0.198) (0.162) (0.116) (0.129)     
Services -0.167 -0.263 0.393 0.837* 1.210 0.786*** -0.378 -0.490     
 (0.278) (0.254) (0.406) (0.501) (0.957) (0.252) (0.753) (0.876)     
Constant 9.018*** 9.367*** 10.908*** 11.519*** 9.038*** 9.265*** 10.773*** 11.433*** 8.022*** 8.745*** 11.045*** 11.570*** 
 (0.251) (0.232) (0.179) (0.200) (0.258) (0.257) (0.185) (0.231) (0.171) (0.142) (0.145) (0.169) 
No of obs. 550 550 550 550 450 450 450 450 1,370 1,370 1,370 1,370 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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In relation to the service sector, capital and skill set variables have been 
omitted due to paucity of observations. Receipt of loans is positively significant 
(p<0.01) for the 1st to the 6th decile. This suggests that support for H3 is limited to 
just beyond the median of the 60% and that more productive firms have a limited 
benefit. With the exception of the 1st decile, foreign ownership is positively 
significant throughout the distribution (p<0.01 to p<0.05) and, with the exception 
of the 9th decile, where it is insignificant.   This indicates that there is strong support 
for H3 within the services sector and emphasises its importance to the Balkan 
region’s economy. Age is now seen as a positive attribute (p<0.01 to p<0.05). Firm 
size (at the conventional levels of significance, i.e. p<0.1) is positive throughout the 
distribution indicating that, together with age, it is seen as an important influence 
on firm productivity. The negative coefficient on competition appears significantly 
across the distribution from the 3rd to the 9th decile (p<0.01 to p<0.1), increasing in 
magnitude at higher levels of the distribution curve.  This indicates that the higher 
up the productivity curve, the greater the pressure from competition, affirming that 
larger, older firms are feeling the greatest competitive pressures. Loans appear to 
be more important below the median, which is the case even under foreign 
ownership. This may be the result of the provision of loans from the transnational 
companies, or the availability of collateral to lenders who are themselves foreign 
owned banks. However, these findings support H2c and H3 and emphasises the 
importance of FDI in the sector together with the availability of loans at the lower 
end of the spectrum.  The importance of firm age and size suggests that older, larger 
and more experienced firms are attractive to FDI.  Above the 1st and 2nd decile, the 
negative effect of competition is a reflection of increasing competitiveness within 
the enlarged EU, encouraged by the presence of foreign ownership. The ever 
present positive significance of cost per worker (p<0.01) indicates that the service 
sector is comfortable with its cost per worker ratios. 
Regarding the manufacturing sector, loans are positively significant 
(p<0.05) in the 1st and 2nd decile suggesting that, within the sector, the least 
productive firms are loan dependent and this view is supported by the positive effect 
of rental capital (p<0.01 to p<0.05) in the same deciles. Therefore, the availability 
of loans and rental capital should be viewed in tandem. The results provide limited 
support for H2b and H2c with no significant effect being seen above the median.  
Size is positive and highly statistically significant (p<0.01) in the 1st decile and 
Foreign ownership (p<0.1) in the 3rd decile, together with the negative coefficient 
of replacement capital (p<0.05). Age is negatively significant (p<0.05) in the 9th 
decile. This suggests that larger firms, possibly privatised, see the opportunities of 
economies of scale but struggle to achieve productivity improvement, whilst 
foreign ownership and the negative perspective of replacement capital may reflect 
foreign owners confronted with the scale of modernisation required. The negative 
impact of firm age in the 9th decile may indicate that older firms have difficulty with 
aging assets and the required cultural changes. Negative effects of skilled workers 
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and positive effects of labour costs feature significantly throughout the distribution 
and give credence to the possible explanations given earlier in this paper.    
The IVQTE model has tested H2c, H3 and H4 and concludes that the 
availability of loans improves productivity up to the 6th decile of the distribution 
curve suggesting that the least productive firms are the beneficiaries.  This may be 
because the most productive firms are better capitalised or are less reliant on debt.  
The key is membership, and this is particularly true of the services sector where 
firms up to the 8th decile have strong statistical significance. The effect in 
manufacturing is more muted beyond the first two deciles with weaker coefficients 
and significance.  Equally the services sector appears to have a greater reliance on 
loans (H2) with the first 6 deciles enjoying the benefits against manufacturing 
where loans are only significant in the first two deciles.  However, in this sector 
rental capital (leasing) is significant up to the median which may indicate leasing is 
used as an alternative to loans since the equipment leased provides its own 
collateral.  The effect of FDI on productivity (H3) is highly significant but is only 
supported in the services sector with significance across the productivity 
distribution curve. This may be due to the strength of the services sector in the 
economy where it accounts for 66% of added value in Serbia and Kosovo increasing 
to 79% in Montenegro and is therefore likely to be a more attractive target for FDI.  
Manufacturing on the other hand, at least in the BEEPS survey, is populated by low 
tech SME’s and with the increasing cost of labour in the Balkan region firms may 
be losing some of their comparative advantage.  Equally it has to be recognised that 
prior to the financial crisis the Balkan region enjoyed significant inflows of funds, 
but this has been reversed since that period and the BEEPS survey conducted in 
2013 may well be reflecting this trend (Gabrisch et al 2016). The puzzling result is 
the lack of support for H4 on the effect of exports on productivity, which is not 
significant in any sector.  This may be due to the low level of exports from seven 
of the eight countries where they account for no more than 20% of GDP and whilst 
there is evidence some countries are well integrated into international production 
networks some 60% of exported goods are from low tech industries and tourism 
where increasing labour costs are diminishing any comparative advantage 
(Gabrisch et al 2016). 
Figures A4 to A9 in Appendix A confirm that the effect of EU membership 
and loans decline as the productivity of firms increase; the only exception being in 
the loan model, where the efficacy of loans in the service sector rises to the median 
point and then rapidly declines.  
Throughout the quantile analyses conducted, negative skill levels and 
positive cost per worker feature throughout the distribution and whilst the positive 
cost per worker reflects the comparative advantage of cheap labour, driven by high 
levels of unemployment in the Western Balkans, the negative coefficient of skilled 
labour is the result of a mismatch between the demand of the burgeoning services 
sector and new technologically based businesses.  This is due in part to a failure of 
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the education system to adapt to the changing skill set required amongst the working 
age population (Bartlett 2013).      
CONCLUSIONS 
Our results indicate that EU membership contributes to improved 
productivity because of unfettered access to the customs union, which promotes 
opportunities for improved economies of scale and the advantages of network 
effects. The significance of loans and rental capital in relation to firm productivity 
is consistent with the findings in Levine and Warusawitharana (2014).  The first 
hypothesis that EU membership provides a productivity advantage to firms in 
member states is supported by the findings of the IPWRA model, however, the 
additional provision of loans has no significance.  The IVQTE model, whilst not 
designed to provide comparative measurements, does indicate that membership has 
the greatest benefit in the services sector with significance in all but the 9th decile.  
Manufacturing is more muted with support restricted to the first 6 deciles against a 
background of diminishing significance.  The second hypothesis that loans improve 
productivity, enhance EU membership and improves productivity outside the EU is 
only supported in the latter case.  The IVQTE model indicates that loans are 
significant to the 6th decile within the services sector but only the first two deciles 
within manufacturing suggesting that there is greater utilisation of loans in the 
former.  However, rental capital (leasing) is significant to the 5th decile which may 
suggest that firms in both sectors at the lower end of the productivity distribution 
curve loans are significant with those beyond the median being better capitalised.  
The third hypothesis that FDI has a positive influence on firm productivity is only 
tested in the IVQTE model and we find that it has a positive influence in the services 
sector across all the deciles except for the first.  This indicates that FDI has a 
positive influence throughout the sector apart from the least productive firms.  No 
significance has been found in manufacturing which may reflect the low-tech nature 
of the Balkan region manufacturing sector proving of no interest to foreign 
investors (Gabrisch et al 2016).  Surprisingly, given the evidence of literature, the 
fourth hypothesis that exports positively influence productivity has no support in 
either the manufacturing or services sector.  This may echo Gabrisch et al’s 2016 
findings that exports in the region are a small percentage of GDP.  
These results have several policy implications for both member and non-
member states. There is little doubt that further enlargement of the EU, to include 
the Western Balkans, would be a major boost to their economic development and 
provide a route out of localism rooted in the ethnic and ideological forces within 
the region. Both membership and loans appear to benefit the least productive firms, 
except for the service sector where both have universal appeal. There is a need for 
greater emphasis on the manufacturing sector where rental capital is positively 
effective amongst the least productive and where enhanced financial intermediation 
would improve supply and provide capital for technical innovation to improve 
productivity. Whilst intermittent, the negative influence of replacement capital is 
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problematical within manufacturing across the distribution and support for an asset 
replacement programme would appear desirable. The fact that 90% of the sample 
is SMEs provides clear evidence of where improvements can be achieved amongst 
the least productive in this sector. The clear success of the service sector in 
attracting FDI should encourage government to improve the environment for 
manufacturing and provide a platform to emulate this performance. A programme 
of modernisation incentives should encourage productivity improvements and lead 
to an encouraging environment for FDI. The paucity of skilled workers must be 
addressed and whilst labour costs would appear to be a comparative advantage, 
income levels may need to be increased to encourage the development of an 
improved skill base.  Equally the issue may be one of management, where the need 
is to improve the quality and ensure that a more skilled cadre of managers are 
provided with an appropriate slice of the economic cake (Adalet McGowan and 
Andrews 2015 p.32). A further conclusion can also be drawn in that the results 
indicate that the disparity in relation to output per worker is sufficiently constrained 
as to suggest that, at least at firm level, the rest of the Balkans states are ready to 
embrace the accession process. 
Notwithstanding its contributions, this study suffers from limitations that 
serve as avenues for further research. Firstly, causality issues may result from any 
unobservables not identified within the matching model. This may also arise 
because of the cross-sectional nature of the data.  Secondly, because of the limited 
number of countries studied, the paucity of observations for service sector capital 
and skilled workers means that the influence of capital on the service sector has 
been immeasurable. Thirdly, the influence of the control variables across the 
productivity distribution curve merit further investigation. Finally, it would also 
allow the creation of longitudinal data to track progress from accession to 2013 and 
allow a contribution to the question “are the Balkans different?” (Estrin and Uvalic, 
2016, p.1). Further research, utilising the BEEPS data over a longer period with the 
inclusion of 27 Eastern European transitional economies, may allow these 
omissions to be addressed.  
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Table A1. Variable Description. 
Variable name Variable description 
Treatment variables in the QTE model 
EU member 
DV=1 if a firm operates in an EU member state; zero 
otherwise. 
Loan receipt DV=1 if a firm received a loan; zero otherwise.  
Outcome variable  
Output per worker 
Log of output per worker derived by dividing total sales 
by total full time equivalent employees 
Independent variables  
Capital (net assets) Net asset value in US dollars. 
Capital (replacement) 
The cost of replacing current capital stock at 2013 
values in US dollars. 
Capital (rental) 
The cost of renting land property and equipment in US 
dollars. 
Export  The percentage of exports to total sales. 
Skilled workers The number of skilled production workers employed. 
Cost per workers The total cost of operations per worker in US dollars. 
Foreign owned Percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors 
Firm age 
Age of firm derived by subtracting the date of formation 
from 2013. 
Bureaucracy 
The average of a Likert scale score ( 0 - no obstacle to 4 
– very severe obstacle) of perceived problems with 
customs, tax administration, business licencing and 
labour regulations. 
Firm size 
Categorical variables =0 if a firm has less than five 
employees; =1 if a firm has more than four and less than 
20 employees; =2 if a firm has between 20 and 99 
employees; =4 if a firm has more than 100 employees. 
Competition 
DV=1 if a firm reported that the number of its 
competitors was less than 15; zero otherwise. 
35 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics for the full sample, manufacturing and service sectors.  
Variables  
Full sample Manufacturing sector Service sector  
No of 
obs. 
Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
Min Max 
No 
of 
obs. 
Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
Min Max 
No 
of 
obs. 
Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
Min Max 
Output per 
worker 
2,433 
10.53 
(1.32) 
3.63 19.86 660 
10.36 
(1.12) 
6.16 13.32 1,596 
10.64 
(1.39) 
3.63 19.86 
Capital (net 
assets) 
2,433 
7,221.24 
(30,447.94) 
0 43,333 660 
25,592.77 
(53178.97) 
0 433,333     
Capital 
(replacement) 
2,433 
16,284.1 
(95,846.51) 
0 3,253,219 660 
57,919.65 
(176,441.6) 
0 3,253,219     
Capital 
(rental) 
2,433 
207.17 
(2,149.33) 
0 94,162 660 
693.34 
(3,984.12) 
0 94,161.96     
Export  2,433 
0.13 
(0.27) 
0 1 660 
0.26 
(0.36) 
0 1 1,596 
0.07 
(0.20) 
0 1 
Skilled 
workers 
788 
0.60 
(0.24) 
0 1.1 647 
0.60 
(0.24) 
0 1.1     
Cost per 
workers 
2,433 
16,913.1 
(36,010.42) 
0 769,953 660 
34,261.48 
(56,507.75) 
0 769,953.1 1,596 
9,937 
(19,648) 
0 307,910 
Foreign 
owned 
2,433 
6.82 
(23.78) 
0 100 660 
7.51 
(24.55) 
0 100 1,596 
6.78 
(23.84) 
0 100 
Firm age 2,418 
16.83 
(13.11) 
1 153 659 
18.87 
(17.12) 
1 153 1,583 
15.8 
(10.32) 
1 68 
Bureaucracy 2,433 
0.56 
(0.56) 
0 3 660 
0.56 
(0.55) 
0 2.6 1,596 
0.57 
(0.56) 
0 3 
Firm size 2,433 
1.46 
(0.73) 
0 3 660 
1.62 
(0.77) 
0 3 1,596 
1.38 
(0.69) 
0 3 
Competition 1,966 
0.43 
(0.49) 
0 1 455 
0.40 
(0.49) 
0 1 1,380 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0 1 
EU member 2,433 
0.34 
(0.48) 
0 1 660 
0.4 
(0.49) 
0 1 1,596 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0 1 
Loan receipt 2,433 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0 1 660 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0 1 1,596 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0 1 
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Table A3. Estimated treatment and outcome models in the full sample (with treatment level 0 as the base category 
in the treatment model) (N=786) 
 Step 1. Treatment model Step 2. Outcome model 
Variables 
Treatment 
=1 
Treatment 
=2 
Treatment 
=3 
Potential 
-outcome 
model for 
treatment 
=0 
Potential 
-outcome 
model for 
treatment=1 
Potential 
-outcome 
model for 
treatment 
=2 
Potential 
-outcome 
model for 
treatment 
=3 
Capital (net assets) 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Export 0.820** 0.062 1.310*** -0.351 -0.191 0.005 0.324 
 (0.344) (0.324) (0.338) (0.354) (0.311) (0.298) (0.249) 
Foreign owned 0.001 -0.012** -0.009* 0.004 0.001 0.009*** 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Skilled workers  -0.681 -0.867** -1.020** -0.743** -0.734** -0.732** -0.688** 
 (0.464) (0.375) (0.497) (0.327) (0.339) (0.367) (0.345) 
Firm age 0.018** 0.007 0.031*** -0.006 0.006 0.001 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Bureaucracy -0.610*** 0.235 -0.115 0.240 0.410*** 0.012 0.246* 
 (0.211) (0.165) (0.208) (0.146) (0.146) (0.144) (0.145) 
Firm size  -0.011 0.605*** 0.456*** -0.024 0.141 -0.168 -0.036 
 (0.171) (0.145) (0.165) (0.112) (0.120) (0.105) (0.120) 
Low-tech -0.630* 0.085 -0.673** -0.907*** -0.840*** -0.222 -0.523** 
 (0.325) (0.285) (0.335) (0.234) (0.207) (0.217) (0.212) 
Mid-tech 0.118 0.052 -0.296 -0.447** -0.447** -0.065 0.113 
 (0.317) (0.305) (0.343) (0.211) (0.218) (0.213) (0.259) 
Services -0.830 -0.338 -0.349 -0.772* 0.377 0.036 1.110*** 
 (0.706) (0.563) (0.644) (0.404) (0.429) (0.482) (0.308) 
Constant -0.242 -0.929** -1.354*** 10.986*** 11.019*** 10.994*** 10.752*** 
 (0.459) (0.405) (0.467) (0.332) (0.288) (0.354) (0.320) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
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Appendix A 
Figure A1. Checking the overlap assumption (common region) for the full 
sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Checking the overlap assumption (common region) for the 
subsample of firms in the service sector. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
d
e
n
s
it
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity score, treatm~t=0
treatm~t=1 treatm~t=2
treatm~t=3
0
2
4
6
d
e
n
s
it
y
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Propensity score, treatm~t=1
treatm~t=0 treatm~t=2
treatm~t=3
0
1
2
3
4
5
d
e
n
s
it
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity score, treatm~t=2
treatm~t=0 treatm~t=1
treatm~t=3
0
1
2
3
4
5
d
e
n
s
it
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity score, treatm~t=2
treatm~t=0 treatm~t=1
treatm~t=3
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3. Checking the overlap assumption (common region) in the 
subsample of firms from the manufacturing sector. 
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Figure A4. Results from the QTE model for the full sample with EU 
membership as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
Figure A5. Results from the QTE model for the manufacturing sector with 
EU membership as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure A6. Results from the QTE model for the service sector with EU 
membership as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7. Results from the QTE model for the full sample with access to 
loans as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure A8. Results from the QTE model for the manufacturing sector with 
access to loans as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
Figure A9. Results from the QTE model for the service sector with access to 
loans as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval.  
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